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Abstract
The public-health community views the mandatory labelling and taxation of fat as prom-
ising tools to control the growth of food-related chronic disease. This paper is the rst to
propose an ex ante evaluation of these two policy options in an oligopolistic setting with dif-
ferentiated products and heterogeneous demand. Using household scanner data on fromages
blancs and dessert yogurts, we separately identify consumer preferences for fat and front-of-
pack fat labels by exploiting an exogenous di¤erence in legal labelling requirements between
these two product categories. Demand estimates are then combined with a supply model to
evaluate both policies. In the absence of any producer price response, making fat labels man-
datory reduces the fat supplied to regular consumers in this market by 38%; an ad-valorem tax
of 10% (5%) on the producer price of full-fat (half-skimmed) products has a similar impact.
Allowing producer price reactions, however, yields much smaller e¤ects: a 9% drop for the fat
tax, and a fall of only 1:5% for mandatory labels. Producers thus neutralise up to 96% of the
impact of mandatory labelling on demand, via large price cuts on products with large ex ante
margins. This illustrates how market forces are largely able to defeat the intended e¤ect of
market-based public-health interventions.
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1 Introduction
What e¤ects do fat taxes and mandatory fat labels have in food markets? In the context of a
worldwide rise in overweight and obesity, such market-based policies have attracted a great deal of
interest from policy-makers and public-health advocates. We here provide an empirical evaluation
of these interventions, comparing their e¤ects on key market indicators and health outcomes, such
as equilibrium prices, market shares, producer prots, consumer welfare, and the quantity of fat
purchased by households.
Fat in calories available for human diet represents between 40 and 45% of total daily calorie
intake in most OECD countries, as against 20-30% one century ago (Popkin and Gordon-Larsen,
2000; James et al., 2004; Oliver, 2006; Etilé, 2011). This trend has been related to the spectacular
growth in obesity and overweight, which has reached epidemic proportions globally, with more than
1 billion adults being overweight worldwide in 2010 (OECD, 2010). In this context, the OECD
has called for the implementation of tax policies on food items with high calory, fat, or sugar
contents (Cecchini et al., 2010).1 A separate public policy proposed by the European Parliament is
the mandatory labelling of the fat-content on fronts-of-packs (FOP): this is easier to use than the
back-of-pack nutritional facts panel, which is already mandatory. FOP labels may help consumers
to move from high to low fat-content products (Wansink et al., 2004; Grunert and Wills, 2007).2 To
date, FOP nutritional labelling has been voluntary. One key element of this debate is that voluntary
FOP labelling does not only play an informational role, it also contributes to di¤erentiation and
market segmentation. When labelling is voluntary, producers are more likely to display low-fat
than high-fatlabels on the FOP. This has two consequences. First, it is not obvious that making
FOP labels mandatory will make consumers better o¤, as they can currently infer from the absence
of any label that the product is high in fat. Second, the producers decision to introduce a FOP
label may depend on unobserved consumer tastes, rendering labelling endogenous in the demand
function. Whether fat-content regulation should remain voluntary or become mandatory is an
important research question, and comparing the e¤ects (on consumers and rms) of mandatory fat
labelling to those of a fat tax policy should help to begin the answer.
Previous research has often used continuous-choice demand models to evaluate the impact of
fat taxes (see, for example, Caraher and Cowburn, 2005; Mytton et al., 2007; Chouinard et al.,
2007; and Allais et al., 2010).3 These allow for substitution between food categories, which are
more or less aggregated, but ignore any substitution either within food categories or towards an
outside good. However, a fat tax is more likely to make consumers of high fat-content exit the
market or switch to the nearest low fat-content counterparts in the same food group, rather than
substitute one food category for another. In addition, producersstrategic reactions have generally
1 In 2009-2010, additional taxes on sugary drinks were proposed in at least 17 US States; Denmark introduced a
25% tax increase on ice cream, chocolate, sweets and soft-drinks in January 2010 (Danish Ministry of Taxation,
2009), and a tax on fat in October 2011; in France, a tax on soft-drinks was introduced in January 2012. 2 See
EUFIC (2012) for an update on nutritional labels in the EU. 3 Noticeable exceptions are Gri¢ th et al. (2010),
and Bonnet and Réquillart (2011).
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been ignored, except in Gri¢ th et al. (2010) and Bonnet and Réquillart (2011). These latter
analyse taxes on, respectively, saturated fats in butter and margarine and sugar in soft drinks, and
estimate the rmstax pass-through rate to consumer prices in a di¤erentiated-product oligopoly
setting.
The e¤ect of nutritional information on consumer choice has mostly been analysed via hypo-
thetical consumer choices, which can lead to overestimation bias (Cowburn and Stockley, 2005).4
Empirical econometric evidence on the impact of mandatory food labels on natural shopping beha-
viour is scarce. The major obstacles are the di¢ culty of nding exogenous variations in producer
label decisions and credible control groups. Nevertheless, some market-level analysis has exploited
quasi-natural experiments, such as changes in labelling legislation due to the enactment of the Nu-
trition Labelling and Education Act (Mathios, 2000; Variyam, 2008) or the lifting of a regulatory
ban against the advertising of the health benets of ready-to-eat cereal (Ippolito and Mathios,
1990). Other work has used eld experiments in supermarkets (Teisl et al., 2001; Berning et al.,
2010; Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2010). These have provided mixed results. However, all of these
have focused on U.S. back-of-pack or shelf labels, and have not explored any strategic producer
reactions to mandatory labelling.
This paper attempts to avoid these pitfalls through the combination of the structural modelling
of the market and a quasi-natural experiment. First, we use scanner data, disaggregated at both
the household and product levels, to estimate a discrete-choice model of demand allowing for both
substitution between products within a same food group and towards an outside option. We model
the supply side as an oligopoly proposing di¤erentiated products, in the spirit of Berry et al.
(1995) and Nevo (2001), to estimate the price-cost margins for each rm, identify strategic price
reactions, and determine the new market-price equilibrium implied by each food policy. Second,
we exploit an exogenous source of variation in legal labelling requirements in the French market for
dessert yogurts and fromages blancs5 to identify the causal impact of fat-content labels on consumer
choice. The French labelling legislation requires producers to signal the percentage of fat contained
in fromages blancs by a fat-content label displayed on the FOP, while fat-content labelling is not
mandatory for dessert yogurts. In particular, producers never put FOP fat-content labels on full-fat
dessert yogurts, but are required to do so for full-fat fromages blancs. Combining these exogenous
variations in legal labelling requirements with brand labelling strategies, between products with
di¤erent fat contents and between dessert yogurts and fromages blancs, and controlling for brands,
distribution channels and demographics, we are able to identify consumer preferences for fat and
fat-content labels separately.
Following the discrete-choice literature, we model consumer preferences using a Mixed Multi-
4 See Grunert and Wills (2007) for a detailed survey. 5 The fromage blanc is a creamy, soft, fresh, white cheese
made with whole, half-skimmed or skimmed milk. In this paper, following the French legislation, we include in the
fromages blancs category the faisselles, which have similar culinary uses. Dessert yogurts include products such as
strained/Greek style yogurts and fromages blancs or yogurts mixed with cream or other animal fats.
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nomial Logit model. In the estimation, we control for the (usual) endogeneity of prices, assuming
that the product-specic valuation of the unobserved characteristics is independent from its past
variations, but also for the (less classic) case where a characteristic is endogenous. As producers
decisions to place a fat-content label on the packaging of a dessert yogurt may be correlated with
unobserved consumer tastes, we also need to control for the endogeneity of fat-content labels. We
do so by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided by exogenous variation in the labelling
requirements for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. Household-specic demand parameters are
then identied from panel scanner data collected from a representative sample of households in
2007. These estimates are used to compute producer price-cost margins, assuming that they com-
pete à la Nash in a Bertrand oligopolistic game. The new market equilibrium implied by each fat
policy can then be simulated.
We show that imposing FOP fat labels reduces the average yearly fat purchases by households
by about 38% when the rm response is ignored. This is largely due to an aversion to fat labels
by consumers of dessert yogurts, which is interpreted as a desire to have the taste without the
guilt of eating unhealthily. When producers can adjust their prices, we nd, perhaps surprisingly,
that mandatory labelling increases the market share of dessert yogurts. This comes from the large
price cuts that producers would e¤ect, via drastic margin reductions ( 68% for full-fat dessert
yogurts). As labelling becomes mandatory for all products, product di¤erentiation falls, which
intensies price competition. The price response of producers of dessert yogurts is made possible
by the sizeable initial margins on dessert yogurts, and high price elasticities just after the policy
shock: the fall in margins is o¤set by the recovery of large market shares. Firms are able to o¤set
96% of the e¤ect of the policy on consumer demand.
Comparing mandatory labelling to an equivalent fat tax (meaning that tax rates are set such
that each policy causes almost the same fall in average yearly fat purchases in the absence of any
rm response), we show that when the rm price response is taken into account taxes are somewhat
more e¤ective than fat labels in reducing household fat purchases: 9% vs. 1:5% respectively.
One reason is that the fat tax maintains the market segmentation between fromages blancs and
dessert yogurts, which avoids intensifying price competition. From a health-policy perspective, we
suggest that the fat tax dominates mandatory labelling. From a consumer perspective, however,
the opposite pertains: assuming perfect rationality, consumer welfare in this market rises by 53%
under mandatory labelling, as a result of the fall in dessert yogurt prices, and falls by 2% with the
fat tax. From the rms perspective, both policies reduce prot, but considerably more so under
mandatory labelling ( 21%) than under the fat tax ( 6%).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and discusses
the boundaries of the market. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and the estimation strategy.
The estimation results are then discussed in Section 4 and the simulations in Section 5. The last
section concludes.
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2 Data
We use household panel scanner data from Kantar Worldpanel (KWP) for the 2007 calendar
year. The advantage of scanner data over the experimental or hypothetical choice approaches is
that observations are based on actual purchases in a natural shopping environment. Consumer
preferences can thus be identied in a realistic setting.
There are 13; 380 households in the initial sample, which is nationally representative of the
French population. The data record, on a weekly basis, all purchases of yogurts and fromages
blancs for home consumption by the household over the year. The Universal Product Code (UPC)
of each purchase is registered using a handheld scanner, as well as the quantity purchased and the
associated expenditure. KWP does not provide UPCs, but a large set of product attributes. We
choose to divide the year into 13 periods of four weeks (the time unit t in the next section). We
thus focus on representative purchase behaviour in each four-week period, i.e. the choices that are
the most-frequently observed in a sense that will be dened below.6
2.1 The relevant market
There are three broad categories of yogurts and fromages blancs: standard yogurts; standard
fromages blancs; and dessert yogurts. This market was chosen for three reasons. First, it accounts
for a quite substantial share of household fat purchases (2:75%). Second, a large variety of products
are o¤ered, which allows consumers to easily switch from one brand to another. Last, the fact that
labelling is mandatory in France for fromages blancs but not for yogurts makes it easier to identify
consumer preferences over labelling and fat separately.
We restrict our analysis to plain products, which represent 43% of all purchases of yogurts
and fromages blancs. Flavored yogurts and fromages blancs contain sugar additives. As such,
fat-content labels may be less salient for consumers, and less relevant from a nutritional point of
view.7 We also eliminate products that are not made from cowsmilk (4:5% of purchases), and
drinking yogurts and yogurts with cereals, which account for less than 1:5% of purchases.
In the remaining sample, 46:3% of the households consuming fromages blancs over a four-week
period also purchased standard yogurts, while only 5:4% purchased dessert yogurts. These statistics
suggest that fromages blancs and standard yogurts are probably not substitutes competing on the
same market, which is the case for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. A formal test comes
from analyzing household budget choices between standard yogurts, dessert yogurts and fromages
blancs, in a classic demand-system setting. Household expenditures on these three categories are
aggregated over the year, and local price indices are computed for each category, as in Lecocq
6 Gri¢ th et al. (2010) choose one unique random shopping trip during the calendar year. In our view, this method
has the disadvantage of introducing more noise into the analysis of consumer preferences. 7 In addition, the French
yogurt and fromage blanc market is characterized by a huge variety of avors (249 di¤erent identied avors in our
dataset), and considering all of these, or even grouping some avors together, would have rendered the estimation
of the model infeasible.
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and Robin (2006). An Almost Ideal Demand System is then estimated and the uncompensated
cross-price elasticities are derived (Deaton and Mullbauer, 1980). We nd only one signicant cross-
price elasticity, indicating that fromages blancs are substitutes for dessert yogurts (the elasticity
is +0:398). An increase in the price of dessert yogurts or fromages blancs does not signicantly
impact the consumption of standard yogurts (see the additional results in Appendix A.1). The
analysis will hence focus on the relevant market for plain fromages blancs, which includes plain
dessert yogurts but not standard yogurts.8
Last, in order to aid our the identication of consumer preferences, we only retain households
which purchased fromages blancs or dessert yogurts in more than 10 weeks over the year. Since
these households clearly have stable tastes for these products, we do not make inferences from
noisy choices. This leaves us with data on 1785 households.
2.2 Product attributes
The data contain information on the fat content of all dessert yogurts and fromages blancs, as well
as their texture, brand, pack size, type of milk used, whether it is organic or not, and whether
probiotics (bidus) have been added or not. These attributes are used to dene the alternatives
available on the French market in 2007.
2.2.1 Fat content and fat-content labels
We sort the products into three fat-content categories: full-fat (more than 6% fat), semi-skimmed
(between 3% and 6%), and skimmed (less than 3%).9 Fat-content labels are mandatory for all
fromage blanc products.10 However, the data do not provide any information about the presence
of fat-content labels for dessert yogurts. We therefore collected additional data from a number of
information sources. The main source is Mintels Global New Products Database (GNPD), which
shows high-resolution color images of the packaging of 80% of the products in our dataset, and their
changes over time. This information is complemented by an examination of the monthly French
publication Linéaires, which provides detailed descriptions and pictures of a number of new food
products launched in France every month. Last, we also visited the popular website www.ickr.com,
which proposes more than 4 billion images, the French consumer network website www.ciao.fr,
and, for a small number of products, old TV advertisements from the on-line audiovisual archives
available of the Institut National de lAudiovisuel.
8 This result is in line with the professional practice in marketing of considering that dessert yogurts and fromages
blancs compete on the market of fromages frais, while yogurts form another market: see for instance the trade
publication Linéaires, No. 173 (September 2002), p.98, No. 187 (December 2003), p.110, and No. 190 (March
2004), p.74. A last argument supporting this view is that fromages blancs and dessert yogurts often have the same
culinary use: they are both served as desserts, with sugar, jam, honey or fruit frequently being added. 9 This
corresponds closely to the division adopted in food marketing, see for instance the professional review Linéaires,
No, 187 (December 2003), p. 110. 10 See the décret 88-1206 in the Journal O¢ ciel de la République Française,
31/12/1988.
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2.2.2 Other characteristics
We control for a number of other product characteristics, which were selected because they were
signicant in preliminary regressions. Di¤erences in hedonic characteristics are captured by a set
of discrete attributes indicating whether the product is a fromage blanc or a dessert yogurt, and
whether its texture is smooth. Health characteristics other than the fat content are captured by a
dummy variable indicating whether the product is organic or has probiotics added. Another binary
variable shows whether the product is sold in individual portions (200g or less). Last, there are 15
dummy variables that control for brand heterogeneity. These include the main national producers
(Yoplait, Danone, Triballat, etc.) and retailer brands (Carrefour, Leclerc, Intermarché, etc.). The
small national brands are grouped together, along with the small retailer brands. We also control
for three levels of brand quality (low-, medium- and high-quality brands). The low-quality category
includes hard-discount and rst-price retailer brands. The national and high-quality retailer brands
form the high-quality category. These attributes together dene 279 distinct varieties of dessert
yogurts and fromages blancs.
2.3 Household choice set, choice and prices
These 279 products discussed above are distributed through a number of stores, supermarkets
and hypermarkets. To simplify the analysis, we dene 14 homogenous categories of distribution
channels, according to criteria such as the company name (for supermarkets and hypermarkets)
and the store format (hard-discount, hyper and supermarkets, grocery stores).11 We retain these
two criteria because they are signicant determinants of quality positioning and pricing strategies.
For each distribution channel, we assume that the set of products observed in the yearly purchase
data is that which was available in each period.
We know the distribution channels that were visited by each household in each period. We
dene each household choice set as the set of all products available in these channels. Choice sets
therefore vary both from one period to another for the same households, and across households
(even living in the same place) in the same period, if they visited di¤erent distribution channels.
There are two situations regarding household choice in each period. If the household did not
make any purchases or purchased a single product, then dening choice is not a problem. However,
when more than one product was purchased, we have to choose that which is the most representative
of household preferences. In order to avoid arbitrary choices, we select this at random with the
selection probabilities being proportional to the share of each product in the households annual
11 The 14 distribution channels are: independent hard discount such as Lidl and Aldi; hard discount Ed; hard
discount Leader Price-Franprix; hyper and supermarket Intermarché; hypermarket Carrefour; hypermarket Casino;
hypermarket and supermarket Cora; hypermarket Auchan; hypermarket Leclerc; hypermarket and supermarket U;
supermarket Carrefour (Stock, Shopi, and Proxi); supermarket Casino (Monoprix, EcoService, PetitCasino, Spar,
and Maxicoop); supermarket Auchan (Atac, and Maximarché); and other distribution channels such as cheesemon-
gers, and grocery stores.
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purchases.12 The price of each product in the household-choice set is constructed in two steps. We
rst calculate the mean unit price for this product by distribution channel and period; we then
average these mean unit prices over the distribution channels that were visited by the household
during the period. Prices thus vary over time and between households according to the distribution
channels visited.
2.4 Market characteristics
Given that the estimation procedure is time-consuming, we reduce the dataset to an extent by ran-
domly selecting ve periods for each household. To avoid having too much noise in the estimation
process, we also exclude products that were purchased less than 10 times in a period. This leaves us
with 224 di¤erent products. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the product characteristics,
in the universal choice set containing all products and in the union of all household choice sets.
Note that there are far fewer low- and medium-quality products in the latter than in the former,
simply because many of these are private labels that can be found in only one distribution channel.
[Table 1 about here]
The main market characteristics are described in Table 2. The nal sample contains 8; 975
observations on the choices of 1; 795 households over ve periods. First note that 12 out of the 24
semi-skimmed dessert yogurts have fat-content labels, while none of the full-fat dessert yogurts (20
products) do. Fromages blancs account for 70:8% of choices, dessert yogurts 23:9%, and the outside
alternative of consuming none of these products over a four-week period for 5:4%. More than 54%
of the fromages blancs purchased are semi-skimmed, about 23% are skimmed, and as many are
full-fat. By way of contrast, 72% of the dessert yogurts purchased are full-fat. On average, full-fat
products are more expensive than the others, with smaller variations in prices for dessert yogurts
than for fromages blancs.13
[Table 2 about here]
2.5 Household characteristics
Our empirical specication also includes household characteristics: income quartiles, household
size, and three dummy variables indicating whether the head of the household is aged over 65,
whether the main shopper is classied as being risky overweight (BMI>27), and whether the main
shopper is a man. Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of these variables, amongst
others, in the estimation sample. These variables are interacted with product attributes in the
estimation to account for the e¤ect of observable characteristics on preferences.
12 For instance, if there are two goods, and the household purchased a quantity Q1 of good 1 and a quantity Q2
of good 2 over the year, then the probability of selecting good 1 in a four-week period where both goods were
purchased is Q1=(Q1 +Q2). 13 The fromage blanc is a traditional food product. As such, some product varieties
are prestigious and expensive.
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[Table 3 about here]
3 Empirical modeling
Following the empirical industrial organization literature , market equilibrium is modeled combining
a exible discrete-choice model of demand with a linear-pricing model of supply. This section
describes this analytical framework, together with the estimation strategy and the simulation of
each policy option.
3.1 Structural model for the demand side
Consumer preferences are modeled in a random-utility framework, via a Mixed Multinomial Lo-
git model (MMNL) (Berry et al., 1995, McFadden and Train, 2000). Preferences over product
characteristics are specied in a exible manner, as this allows for both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in the intercept and slopes of the utility function. Household heterogeneity in the
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for fat-content labels can thus be more precisely estimated. The MMNL
also relaxes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternativesconstraint imposed by the standard Con-
ditional (or Multinomial) Logit model, which is unlikely to hold at the aggregate level as the choice
set varies from one household to another.
3.1.1 The random utility model
Each household i = 1; :::; N faces a set of Jit products in a choice situation t = 1; :::; T .14 Each
product j 2 Jit is described as a bundle of characteristics. As in many other papers, we assume that
all product characteristics are observable (or can be observed by careful inspection) by consumers
but some are unobserved by the econometrician. Examples of the observable characteristics are
package size, brand, nutritional facts, etc; the unobserved characteristics include the position of
the product within the range of products sold under the same brand or the way it is displayed and
advertised in a particular distribution channel.
Formally, denote by pijt the price of good j faced by household i in period t, and lj the binary
variable indicating whether a fat-content label is displayed on the packaging of j. Further, let
xj denote the vector of observed exogenous attributes of j and let j = 0 be the outside (or no
purchase) option, whose characteristics are all set to zero. Considering that each household buys
only one product at a time, the utility that household i obtains from the consumption of one unit
of good j in period t can be written as
uijt = vijt + "ijt = vi(pijt; lj ; xj ;
p
i ; 
l
i; i) + "ijt; (1)
14 In the empirical section below, a choice situation is dened as a four-week period; the set of products is indexed
by i as households visit di¤erent distribution channels and therefore face di¤erent choice sets (see Section 2).
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where vijt is the deterministic part of utility, depending on the observed attributes of j, 
p
i , 
l
i
and i are parameters representing the preferences of household i over pijt, lj and xj , respectively,
and "ijt is unobserved utility. The latter captures consumer valuation of the unobserved product
characteristics.
3.1.2 Endogenous prices and fat-content labels
There is empirical evidence that some of the observed and unobserved characteristics are correlated,
producing endogeneity problems (Berry, 1994). For instance, promoted products are often moved
to the front of the shelf, advertised and sold at a lower price at the same time. The estimated
impact of observed prices on demand will then capture both a true price e¤ect and the e¤ect
of unobserved marketing. Prices may also be endogenous if some unobserved characteristics are
positively valued by consumers, who thus are ready to pay a premium for them. This may be taken
into account by producers in determining their prices. In both cases, we have E("ijt j pijt) 6= 0.
We instrument the current price by its lagged changes. The identifying assumption is that,
controlling for brands, distribution channels, and demographics, the individual valuation of the
product-specic unobserved characteristics, "ijt, is independent of its own past changes. Given
this assumption, the valuation of a particular product will be independent of the price changes
for that same product in the same distribution channel.15 At the same time, common production
and/or distribution costs imply that the price of a product within a distribution channel will be
correlated with its past changes, which can therefore be used as valid instrumental variables (IVs).
The price changes that we consider are those observed between the current and the last period.
They are constructed in the same way as the price levels: for each product, the mean unit price
and its change are rst calculated for each distribution channel and period; these mean unit price
changes are then averaged over the distribution channels that were visited by the household in the
corresponding period.
Most papers dealing with endogeneity in MMNL models have focussed on price endogeneity,
assuming the exogeneity of all other observed characteristics. We here relax this assumption for
the fat-content label, as the producers decision to put a fat-content label on the packaging of a
dessert yogurt may be correlated with some unobserved consumer tastes. In this case, E("ijt j lj =
1) 6= E("ijt j lj = 0).
An IV for fat-content labels can be constructed by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment
from the exogenous variation in labelling rules between fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. Con-
sidering the absence of label as a treatment, we know that the probability of being treated is
zero for fromages blancs, regardless of their fat content (since labelling is mandatory), and more
or less positive for dessert yogurts, depending on their fat content. The marginal value of a fat-
15 This is similar to Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), except that they instrument current prices by past price levels.
This choice is valid only if "ijt is uncorrelated over time. Here, we rather consider that "ijt is likely to be stable
through time, because it essentially relates to time-invariant attributes such as the colour and the shape of the
packaging and the product name.
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content label is then identied from the empirical market shares, using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimator, assuming that the di¤erences in unobservable factors between consumers of full-fat and
semi-skimmed products are the same for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. This assumption and
the resulting exclusion restriction hold if the consumers of fromages blancs are not more sensitive
to a fat increase than the consumers of dessert yogurts. In addition, it seems reasonable to consider
that the decision to label a dessert yogurt is taken once and for all when introducing the product
on the market. Changes in unobserved factors over time, in customer services or the perception of
the product for example, have little to do with this (Ackerberg et al., 2005). Last, the interaction
between the dessert yogurt and the semi-skimmed (or full-fat) dummy variables is a good predictor
of the producers labelling decision: the fatter the dessert yogurt, the less likely the producer is to
signal this to consumers. In our data set, full-fat dessert yogurts are indeed never labeled.
3.2 Empirical estimation of the demand functions
3.2.1 A control function approach to endogeneity
To correct for price and fat-content label endogeneity, decompose "ijt as
"ijt = e"pijt + e"lijt + e"ijt; (2)
where e"pijt is the error component related to the price, e"lijt the error component related to the
presence of a label, and e"ijt is an iid extreme-value term.
We then apply a control function approach, as proposed by Petrin and Train (2009) for discrete-
choice models. Consider the following orthogonal decompositions for e"pijt and e"lijt
e"pijt = ppijt + ppijt and e"lijt = llijt + llijt; (3)
where pijt and 
l
ijt are jointly normal, and 
p
ijt and 
l
ijt are iid standard normal (whose standard
deviations p and l are estimated). In this equation, pijt and 
l
ijt represent the variations in
prices and fat-content labels that are explained neither by the other observed variables nor by
the instruments, and which may a¤ect utility (if p or l 6= 0). There is endogeneity as these
unobserved factors are correlated with prices or fat-content labels. The control-function approach
explicitly takes into account the e¤ect of pijt and 
l
ijt on utility, by introducing proxy measures of
these variables into the estimations. These proxy measures are constructed in a rst stage, as the
residuals from the regressions of the price and fat-content label variables on all of the exogenous
variables and the instruments, zijt
pijt = 
pzijt + 
p
ijt and lj = 
lzijt + 
l
ijt; (4)
where p and l are vectors of parameters. The estimated residuals, ^pijt and ^
l
ijt, are called the
control functions. Their introduction, as additional explanatory variables, in the regressions solves
the endogeneity problem.
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3.2.2 Parameterisation of the utility function
Combining (1) to (3), and assuming a linear specication for the deterministic part of the utility
function vi(), we have
uijt = vijt + 'ijt + e"ijt; (5)
where
vijt =  pi pijt + lilj + 0ixj and 'ijt = p^pijt + l^lijt + ppijt + llijt: (6)
The tastes for observed product characteristics, pi , 
l
i and i, are modeled as a function
of observable household characteristics. As we are primarily interested in the heterogeneity of
consumer preferences for fat-content labels, we further allow pi and 
l
i to depend on unobservable
household characteristics. Formally, denote respectively si and i as the vectors of observed and
unobserved attributes of household i, and let i = ( pi ; li). Then
i = +i +Asi and i =  +Bsi; (7)
where  = ( p; l) is the vector of average tastes for the price and the label in the population, and
A, B and  are respectively two matrices and a symmetric matrix of parameters (specically,  is
the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of i). Under this specication, the elements
of +i correspond to the random coe¢ cients for the price and label variables; we assume that
pi follows a log-normal distribution and 
l
i a normal distribution.
16 The two distributions are
correlated (the o¤-diagonal element of  is non-zero). We hence end up with a MMNL model with
mixing over the error components and random coe¢ cients for the endogenous variables.
3.2.3 Likelihood and estimation procedure
The choice probabilities can be obtained by summing the choices implied by the utility model
over the distribution of the unobserved attributes of households in the population of interest, i
and e"ijt, as well as over the distribution of the error components, pijt and lijt. Dene yijt as an
indicator variable which equals 1 if household i purchases good j in period t, and 0 otherwise. Each
household is supposed to choose the utility-maximizing option, and assuming that ties occur with
probability zero, the choice criterion is
yijt = 1 if uijt > uikt 8j 6= k; (8)
= 0 otherwise.
Under the additional assumptions that there is no error component, i.e. e"pijt = e"lijt = 0, and that
household heterogeneity enters the utility function only through the additive error term e"ijt, i.e.
si = i = 0, the model reduces to the standard Multinomial Logit model (MNL).17
16 The estimation does not converge when assuming a log-normal distribution for both coe¢ cients. 17 Although
very attractive because of its extreme tractability, the MNL model unreasonably restricts substitution patterns (see,
for example, Berry, 1994).
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In the hypothetical situation where e"pijt, e"lijt and i are observed and are di¤erent from zero,
the above model corresponds to a MNL formulation where the observed product characteristics
and household attributes are interacted, with choice probabilities given by18
P (yijt = 1 j ijt; i; ) =
exp(vijt(i) + '(ijt))
1 +
P
k2Jit;k 6=0 exp(vikt(i) + '(ikt))
; (9)
where ijt = fpijt; lijtg,  is the full parameter set, P (yijt = 1 j ijt; i; ) is the probability that
alternative j is purchased by household i at time t conditional on ijt and i, and the utility derived
from the consumption of the outside alternative is normalized to zero. The probability of observing
the sequence of choices made by household i in periods t = 1; :::; T , denoted wi = fyijt = 1gTt=1, is
then
P (wi j ijt; i; ) =
TY
t=1
X
j2Jit
yijtP (yijt = 1 j ijt; i; ): (10)
However, since ijt and i are not actually observed, the relevant probability has to be uncondi-
tional, as follows
P (wi j ) =
Z
P (wi j ijt; i; )g(ijt)f(i)didijt; (11)
where f(i) is the joint density function of i and g(ijt) = (
p
ijt)(
l
ijt), with () being the
standard normal density function.
Given that each component of ijt and i adds a dimension to the integral, it is not possible to
solve (11) analytically by integrating out over ijt and i. The most common solution is to replace
the choice probability by the following unbiased, smooth and tractable simulator
eP (wi j ) = 1
D
DX
d=1
P (wi j ijtd; id; ); (12)
where ijtd and id denote the d-th draw from the distributions of ijt and i, and D is the number
of draws. The simulated log-likelihood function can then be written as
eL() = NX
i=1
ln eP (wi j ): (13)
The estimation procedure consists of two steps. First, the residuals ^pijt and ^
l
j are predicted
by regressing the price and label variables on the instruments, all product characteristics, includ-
ing their interactions with household attributes, as listed in Table 3, and the distribution channel
and brand xed e¤ects.19 These residuals are then used as control functions in the above likeli-
hood function. The variance-covariance matrix is corrected to account for the additional variance
introduced by the rst-stage estimation.
18 In order to make the presentation simpler here, all of the other conditioning arguments (product and consumer
attributes, reduced-form residuals) are omitted. 19 The identifying instrument for label is signicant at the 1%
level in both rst-stage regressions; the IV for price is signicant at the 1% level in the label regression and at the
10% level in the label regression.
14
3.2.4 Empirical identication of the distribution of consumer tastes
The empirical identication of MMNL models is known to depend on the richness of the data
in terms of variation in the explanatory variables.20 Cherchi and Ortúzar (2008) investigate the
e¤ect of data richness on the empirical identication of the binomial version of the MMNL. Using
Monte Carlo simulations, and assuming that choice sets di¤er across observations, they nd that
data richness does indeed matter and, in particular, that identication problems arise when slope
heterogeneity is applied to a characteristic that has little variability between alternatives. They also
show that the observation of more than one choice per individual (e.g. panel data) makes empirical
identication easier and sharply reduces the e¤ect of sample size. Their analysis, however, focusses
on continuous characteristics. The identication of slope heterogeneity in both continuous and
discrete variables, and the impact of choice-set variation (across individuals and/or markets) on
identication are addressed in Lecocq (2010). Monte Carlo results show that MMNL models are
empirically identied when they are estimated on panel data, regardless of the type of variable,
even when the set of alternatives is the same for all observations. Variation in the choice set
strengthens identication for discrete characteristics.
By construction, we here retain as much information and variability as possible: ve choices are
observed per households and the choice set of available products varies from one choice situation
to another and across households (via the distribution channels). This guarantees the empirical
identication of slope heterogeneity for any type of variable.
3.3 Structural model for the supply side
Producers are likely to adjust to exogenous shocks, and ignoring their strategic behaviour may
lead to biased estimates of the e¤ect of public policies (Gri¢ th et al., 2010; Bonnet and Réquillart,
2011). The simulation of policy e¤ects on market equilibrium therefore requires a structural model
of the supply side. In the demand model, two variables result from rmsstrategic decisions: price
and label.21 However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the labelling decision is taken when the
product is introduced, and is not a¤ected by a fat tax (it becomes strictly exogenous in the case
of mandatory labelling).22 We thus focus on price as the rms only strategic variable.
20 Proofs of the theoretical identication of MMNL models have recently been provided, under the assumption that
the set of alternatives di¤ers across observations (see Bajari et al., 2012; Berry and Haile, 2009, 2010; Fox et al.,
2011). Even when a model is shown to be theoretically identied, it may not be empirically identied, because
the data do not support it. We here discuss empirical identication. 21 While the explicit modeling of the rms
pricing strategy is now common in the literature, modeling the rms choice of characteristics is both rarer and
complicated: see Crawford and Shum (2001), who model the rms choice of quality but only deal with monopoly
situations with one observed characteristic; another approach mentioned by Ackerberg et al. (2007) is similar to
Olley and Pakes (1996) and requires dynamic modeling. 22 This is justied by the fact that rms often prefer to
introduce new food products rather than modify the characteristics of existing ones.
15
3.3.1 The linear-pricing model
We assume that rms compete à la Nash-Bertrand, i.e. by setting prices in order to maximise their
prot conditional on the demand parameters and other rmsprices, as in Berry et al. (1995) and
Nevo (2001).23 Suppose that there are M producers on the market, each producing a subset Gm
of G, the total number of products on the market. Denoting by pj and cj the price and (constant)
marginal cost of production of product j, respectively, the prot of producer m, m, can be written
as
m =
X
j2Gm
(pj   cj)sj(p; );
where sj(p; ) is the predicted market share of product j for all j 2 G, depending on the prices of
all products, p, and demand parameters.24 Market share is calculated as sj(p; ) =
P
i;t P (yijt =
1 j ), where
P (yijt = 1 j ) =
Z
P (yijt = 1 j ijt; i; )g(ijt)f(i)didijt; (14)
which can be approximated by simulation, with P (yijt = 1 j ijt; i; ) given by (9). Assuming a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, the price of good j produced and sold by producer m
must satisfy the following rst-order conditions
sj(p; ) +
X
k2Gm
(pk   ck)@sk(p; )
@pj
= 0; (15)
for all j 2 Gm and m = 1; :::;M . Solving (15) provides the price-cost margins for each product, as
a function of the estimated demand parameters. Given the observed prices, the marginal costs are
identied. Assuming that the marginal costs and demand parameters are xed, the equilibrium
condition (15) can then be used to identify the impact of public policies on the market equilibrium
(equilibrium prices and market shares). We analyze the mandatory labelling of all dessert yogurts
on the one hand, and a fat tax proportional to the fat content on the other.
3.3.2 Simulation algorithm
The implementation of mandatory labelling implies the replacement of the label variable by a vector
of ones, l.25 We recalculate, for each producer m and each item in Gm, the new market shares,
sj (p; ), and all of the corresponding derivatives, @s

k(p; )=@pj , using the new label variable, l
,
the estimated demand parameters and probability (14), where vijt and cijt are now as follows
vijt = vij =  pi pj + lilj + 0ixj and 'ijt = p^pj + ppijt:
23 A recent literature enriches this setup, by taking vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers into
consideration (see Villas-Boas, 2007; Bonnet and Dubois, 2010; Bonnet et al., 2012). The hypothesis of capacity
constraints is maintained, which means that our results will pertain to the short-term equilibrium e¤ects of policies.
24 For each product, there is now one single price which is the average, over periods and distribution channels, of the
mean unit prices computed in Section 2.3. This therefore no longer depends on the i and t subscripts. 25 We assume
that the labeling cost is zero or negligible for two reasons: rst, as the fat-content is listed in the nutrient facts
displayed on the packaging of all products, its determination for dessert yogurts is costless; second, as mandatory
labeling simply consists in sticking a fat-content label on the front of the packaging, marketing and associated costs
should be small relative to the products total cost.
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The terms used to correct for label endogeneity here vanish from the 'ijt expression since the label
variable is strictly exogenous once the policy is implemented. The rst-order conditions (15) are
then used to nd a new price vector, p0, given s

j (p; ) and @s

k(p; )=@pj . If p

0 is close enough
to the observed price vector, p, equilibrium prices are unchanged. Otherwise, a new price vector,
piter, at the iter-th iteration is derived from
sj (p

iter 1; ) +
X
k2Gm
(pk;iter   ck)
@sk(p

iter 1; )
@pj;iter 1
= 0;
for all j 2 Gm and m = 1; :::;M . The market shares are obtained using (14) with
vijt = vij =  pi pj;iter 1 + lilj + 0ixj and 'ijt = p^pj;iter 1 + ppijt;
where ^pj;iter 1 is the residual from the regression of p

j;iter 1 on zijt and all exogenous variables.
We iterate over piter until convergence is reached, that is when maxj jpj;iter   pj;iter 1j < 10 5.
We assume that the fat tax is ad valorem, proportional to the fat content, such that the
consumer price for product j is
pj = (1 +  cat;j)pj
where pj denotes the producer price for product j and  cat;j the tax rate assigned to product j
in the fat-content category cat. Below,  cat;j is set equal to 0, 0:05 or 0:10 when j is a skimmed,
semi-skimmed or full-fat product, respectively. In the same way as for the algorithm described to
calculate equilibrium prices under mandatory labelling, we obtain a new vector of producer prices,
piter, at the iter-th iteration solving
sj(p
; ) +
X
k2Gm
(pk;iter   ck)
@sk(p
; )
@pj
(1 +  cat;j) = 0;
for all j 2 Gm and m = 1; :::;M , where p represents the new consumer price vector whose j-th
element pj is given by p

j = (1 +  cat;j)p

j;iter 1. As above, we iterate over the producer price
vector until maxj jpj;iter   pj;iter 1j < 10 5.
4 Estimation results
This section presents the MMNL estimates obtained using the control function approach described
in Section 3 to correct for the endogeneity of price and label variables. All of the estimations below
are carried out using 500 Halton draws.26 The variances of the estimators are corrected by standard
formulae for two-step estimators (Murphy and Topel, 1985), given the additional variation due to
the introduction of the residuals from the rst-step instrumental regressions.
26 One di¢ culty with MMNL models is that the simulated log-likelihood functions are not as well-behaved as standard
log-likelihood functions. In particular, using too few draws in the simulator (12) may mask identication issues (see
Chiou and Walker, 2007). These can be revealed by the instability of parameter and standard error estimates as
the number of draws increases. We estimated the model for D = 100; 200; 300; 500 and 1000 draws, and obtained
stable estimates from D = 300 onwards. These results are available upon request from the authors.
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4.1 Utility functions
Table 4 shows the estimated coe¢ cients of the MMNL model: these can be interpreted directly in
terms of marginal utilities. As outlined in the previous section, price and label marginal utilities
have both deterministic and random components. The rst column shows the mean marginal
utility of the product characteristics for a reference main shopper who is a woman aged under
65, with BMI under 27, living in a household in the top income quartile. The second column
shows the estimated standard deviations of each random component. All are signicant at the 1%
level, indicating that the marginal utilities of price and label do vary with unobservable household
characteristics. The remaining columns list the coe¢ cients for a number of interactions between
the product characteristics, listed in the rst column, and the household characteristics, in the rst
row (household income quartiles, household size, the main shopper being risky overweight, a man,
and aged over 65). For instance, the di¤erence in the mean marginal utility of price between the
reference shopper and one in the rst income quartile (rst line, fourth column) is  0:232 utility
units. The bottom part of Table 4 provides the estimates of the price and label control functions
and the variances of the associated error components.
[Table 4 about here]
As expected, the probability of choosing an alternative falls with its price. The marginal utility
of price is the inverse of the marginal utility of income. Its mean is negative ( 1:870), and larger
for households below median income, which is consistent with poorer households having a higher
marginal utility of income. The standard deviation of the random e¤ect on price is fairly high
(1:995), implying that the marginal utility of income is very heterogeneous, beyond the e¤ect of
the observed socio-demographic attributes.
Fat-content labels have, on average, a positive value (0:592 for the reference individual), but
once again the standard deviation is large relative to the mean e¤ect (3:850): there considerable
unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences over these labels. The elderly tend to dislike fat-
content labels, while there is a hump-shaped income e¤ect peaking in the second income quartile.
The marginal utility of labels is not signicantly higher when the main shopper is risky overweight
(BMI>27). The random unobserved household attributes are negatively correlated, with a coe¢ -
cient of  0:77. A strong taste for labels is likely associated with a greater marginal disutility of
price, which limits the willingness-to-pay for labels.
The coe¢ cients on the control functions, at the bottom of Table 4, are both positive and
signicant. Ignoring label endogeneity leads to over-estimates of the marginal utility of labels, with
an estimated mean base coe¢ cient of 1:710 (instead of 0:592). This suggests that, when labelling
is not mandatory, rms display labels according to the consumer valuation of some unobserved
product characteristics. It is easy to imagine that, in the case of semi-skimmed dessert yogurts,
the label is just one component of the whole packaging, which can also generate hedonic and
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health expectations through the use of specic colors, shapes, etc. (see inter alia Ares and Deliza,
2010). Likewise, the marginal disutility of price is slightly underestimated when the presence of
unobserved product characteristics is ignored ( 1:763 vs.  1:870).
Households tend to prefer semi-skimmed and full-fat products to skimmed ones. This taste for
fat is more developed in low-income households, and when the main shopper is a man or elderly.
Valli and Traill (2005) have previously found that the French dislike low-fat yogurts, as compared
to the British, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese. It is worth noting that risky-overweight shoppers
prefer either low-fat or full-fat products to semi-skimmed ones. This may suggest two di¤erent types
of consumers among those at risk for overweight-related diseases. The literature in sensory research
emphasises that two kind of motives underlie consumer preferences for fat in dairy products. The
fat content is positively related to taste and immediate hedonic pleasure (Wardle and Solomons,
1994; Westcombe and Wardle, 1997), but may also be negatively related to healthiness via delayed
health damage (Grunert et al., 2000). Risky-overweight individuals are more likely to be concerned
by the fat-disease relationship, but also to exhibit a strong taste for fat. The polarization of their
preferences between low- and full-fat products then likely reects opposite hierarchies of purchase
motives: for some health matters more than taste, while the reverse holds for others.
Table 4 also reveals that low- and medium-quality products are much less popular than high-
quality ones for high-income households, while they have more success in low-income and large
households. Male main shoppers are less likely to like products sold in small portions.27 Last,
the bidus/organic characteristic has no signicant e¤ect on utility, while smooth textures are
associated with a utility loss, consistent with the fact that non-smooth varieties (especially faisselles
and fromages blancs de campagne) are considered as luxuries and part of French culinary culture.
4.2 The Willingness-To-Pay for a fat-content label
The Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for a label is dened as the change in price (here expressed in e)
that keeps utility unchanged when a fat-content label is added to the front and sides of the pack-
aging. A household-specic WTP can be calculated from the estimates, conditional on household-
specic information (observed choices, product and household characteristics), from equation (??)
in Appendix A.2.
Our key nding is that a non negligible fraction of households (38%) have WTPs less than or
equal to zero (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).28 This proportion varies by demographic group,
but not very much: in particular, it is the same whether the main shopper in the household is risky
overweight or not, and only slightly higher (41%) when the shopper is obese; moreover, it is only
27 This gender e¤ect is consistent with previous ndings in the nutrition literature. In France, as in many countries,
body standards are imposed far more vociferously on women than on men (Stearns, 2002, p.189). As a result,
women are more prone to restrict their consumption in order to control their weight. Small-portion packs are seen
as an e¤ective means of controlling consumption (Stroebele et al., 2009). It is thus unsurprising that women have a
greater taste for small portions. 28 Note that, when we constrain the marginal utility of information to be positive,
the estimates do not converge, showing that such this restriction is rejected by the data.
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a little lower in the rst income quartile (35% vs. 39-40% in the upper quartiles), which suggests
that labelling policies may not have regressive welfare e¤ects.
Fat-content labels are thus not positively valued by all consumers, and mandatory labelling
may then reduce their welfare, at least in the short run. This result is at odds with the stand-
ard predictions from the economics of information, where information provision is considered to
always enhance consumer welfare as it favors market segmentation, which leads to a better match
between consumer preferences and product characteristics. Here, it seems that it is the absence of
information that favors product di¤erentiation and market segmentation. As noted above, fat is
a vector of immediate hedonic pleasure, but also produces unpleasant health consequences. When
consumers are in conict between the short-term pleasure of eating and the long-term goal of health
preservation, informing them of the nutritional value of the choice options is likely to increase the
anticipated guilt and psychic costs associated with less-healthy products. The fall in utility is
larger for consumers who have a strong hedonic taste for fat (Wansink and Chandon, 2006, Kivetz
and Keinan, 2006, Okada, 2005). They may thus prefer not to deal with information, in order to
peacefully enjoy the pleasure of eating a product that they enjoy.29 Nevertheless, it remains the
case that a large majority of households are ready to pay positive amounts to have fat-content
labels displayed on the front-of-pack. This is also true for those in the rst income quartile and
with a risky-overweight/obese main shopper, which suggests that the welfare benets produced
by fat-content labels are likely to be positive in the populations usually targeted by public-health
policies.
One last remark is in order. Caplin and Leahy (2001) propose a theoretical framework that can
be used to rationalize preferences for ignorance. The basic idea is that individuals may be subject
to anticipatory feelings of anxiety in their current utility when the distribution of choice outcomes
is uncertain. This can induce aversion to information, as the worst distribution can emerge from the
resolution of uncertainty (see Köszegi, 2003, for an application to medical check-ups). Although
this type of preference departs from traditional utility specications, it does not require that we
abandon the principle of revealed preferences. As such, we can use the estimated utility functions
for welfare analysis.
4.3 Price-cost margins
Marginal costs are recovered for each product by inverting the rst-order conditions in (15). Their
mean (and standard deviation), as well as the associated average price-cost margins, are then
computed for each producer. These cannot however be listed in detail here for condentiality
29 Marketing research has shown that anticipation of guilt feelings plays an important role in food choices
(Baumeister, 2002; Dhar and Simonson, 1999; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Wertenbroch, 1998; King et al., 1987).
The trade publication Linéaires, covering the launch of a new dessert yogurt in its issue of April 2001 (p. 50),
reports that the producer explicitly wanted to avoid feelings of guilt among consumers. This was made through the
choice of packaging colors and words reminiscent of "lightness" (a light blue colour scheme, the words "pearl" or
"foam" etc.).
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reasons. On average, the marginal costs and price-cost margins are equal to e1:33 (with a standard
deviation of e0:69) and 47%, respectively. Unsurprisingly, unit costs are lower for the main retailer
brands (between e0:73 and e1:02) than for the main national brands (between e1:23 and e1:69)
Nevertheless, the price-cost margins for both types of brands are quite similar, so that di¤erences in
production costs are passed onto consumer prices. The top panel of Table 7 shows the initial market
shares, producer prices and margins for ve categories of products (skimmed, semi-skimmed and
full-fat fromages blancs, and semi-skimmed and full-fat dessert yogurts). The margins are between
60% and 70% for the dessert yogurts, and around 45% for the fromages blancs.
5 Ex ante policy evaluation
The methodology described in Section 3.3 is applied to the above-estimated demand functions, to
ex ante evaluate two fat policies: (i) mandatory labelling requiring all products to label fat-content
on the front-of-pack; and (ii) an ad-valorem fat tax. Tax rates are set so as to produce a meaningful
comparison between the two policies. As one key comparison criterion is household fat purchased,
we choose the tax rates for semi-skimmed and full-fat products so as to yield approximately the
same reduction in total fat purchases as mandatory labelling, in the absence of any rm response.
Increasing producer prices by 10% and by 5% for full-fat and semi-skimmed products respectively
produces this result (see the rst line of Table 5).30
The policies are simulated both with and without a producer price response, to compare their
e¤ectiveness in reducing the quantity of fat purchased, and their impact on market shares, prices
and consumer surplus. We rst present the results in terms of health (fat purchases) and welfare.
We then explore in detail the market mechanisms behind these results.
5.1 The change in household fat purchases and welfare
Table 5 lists the change in household annual fat purchases, by demographic group, with and
without producer price reactions. Household annual fat purchases are calculated by multiplying
the predicted choice probabilities by rst the fat content of each product and then the 2007 purchase
frequency. Pre-policy, 844g of fat were purchased on average per year by households participating
in this market. Ignoring producer price responses, the policies produce large falls in fat purchases:
of 300  325g (around  38%) After accounting for the producer price response, this gure is 76:5g
( 9:1%) for the fat tax and  12:5g ( 1:5%) for labelling. If we aggregate these results over all
households and extrapolate them to the entire French population, 2; 361 tons of fat are initially
purchased by households via fromage blanc and dessert yogurt. Fat tax and mandatory labelling
lead to falls of 5:55% and 0:9% (not shown in the table).
30 In all of the simulations we assume that the set of products is xed and that pricing is the only strategy available
to rms: product entry is excluded.
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The fat tax a¤ects all demographic groups similarly (between  8% and  10%), except house-
holds where the main shopper is a man ( 6:4%). The e¤ects of mandatory labelling show more
variation, with a tiny increase in fat purchases in households whose main shopper is obese (+0:2%),
and a large fall for households in the rst income quartile ( 4:4%).
[Table 5 about here]
Table 6 shows the change in household consumer surplus by demographic group, when producer
price responses are taken into account.31 A fat tax reduces surplus by 2:1% on average, as con-
sumer prices rise. Conversely, mandatory labelling yields a large rise in average surplus (52:5%).
Di¤erences by demographic group are only small.
[Table 6 about here]
Why does mandatory labelling have such an e¤ect on consumer surplus? We now show that this
is generated by the large fall in the price of dessert yogurts, which more than o¤sets any disutility
from labels which is mainly found for consumers of dessert yogurts.
5.2 Impact on market equilibrium, producer margins and prots
The e¤ects of both policies on market shares, prices and margins are summarized in Table 7.
The middle and bottom panels present changes in shares, prices and margins following mandatory
labelling and a fat tax, respectively, while the top panel describes the initial situation. For each
policy, the rst line represents the change in market share, in percentage points (pp), when only
household responses are taken into account; the three remaining lines show the changes in shares
(pp), prices (e) and margins (pp) after producer price responses.
[Table 7 about here]
A rst striking result is that the simulated market equilibrium changes sharply when we allow
for producer price responses. When we ignore them, shown above by the changes in fat purchases,
both policies hit the target, although in di¤erent ways. Overall, mandatory labelling appears more
e¢ cient than the fat tax in reducing the demand for full-fat products ( 8:6 pp vs.  4:9 pp).
The fall in the market share of full-fat dessert yogurts, from 17:6% to 5:0% ( 12:6 pp), following
the introduction of a label is far from o¤set by the rise in the market share of (cheaper) full-fat
fromages blancs (+4 pp). All fromage blanc categories (as well as the outside option) benet from
this fall. The explanation is that, apart from their taste for fat, most dessert yogurt consumers
are fat lovers who do not want to be informed about the fat they eat. Their WTP for fat-content
labels is indeed low, and often negative: for instance, the median WTP amongst households who
31 The formulae for these welfare calculations appear in Appendix A.3. These are of course short-term welfare e¤ects,
since the welfare impact of health changes are not included.
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purchased a full-fat dessert yogurt at least once is  e4:74. By way of comparison, the gure for
households who purchased a full-fat fromage blanc at least once is e0:42 (see Table A.3 in Appendix
A.2). Dessert yogurt consumers may move not only to full-fat fromages blancs because they are
cheaper, but also to lighter categories of fromages blancs to attenuate the psychic costs of eating
fatty products; they may stop consuming as well.
Allowing for supply-side price responses completely changes this picture. Labelling then leads
to a small rise in the market share of dessert yogurts (+1:1 pp for full-fat dessert yogurts), at
the expense of skimmed and semi-skimmed fromages blancs ( 1:9 pp and  8:1 pp, respectively).
This can be explained by the large fall in the price of dessert yogurts: semi-skimmed and full-
fat dessert yogurts exhibit price falls of about e0:95 and e1:39, respectively, hence becoming the
cheapest products on this market. In spite of this fall in prices, the margins remain positive for all
products.32
In the absence of a strategic price response, the fat-tax impact on market shares is smaller
than that of mandatory labelling, especially for full-fat dessert yogurts. This however reverses
with producer price responses. The market share is reduced by 2:3 pp for full-fat fromages blancs,
and by 1:4 pp for full-fat dessert yogurts. The corresponding increase in the share of skimmed
fromage blancs (+2:8 pp) and semi-skimmed dessert yogurts (+1 pp) shows that households move
away from the fatter varieties. The changes in market share are smaller as producers do not fully
pass the tax on to consumer prices. For instance, for full-fat dessert yogurts, the nal increase in
consumer price with 100% pass-through would be e0:31 (3:06 times the tax of 10%), whereas it
is only e0:12 (i.e. (3:06   0:17)  110% minus 3:06) with a price response. This means that the
pass-through rate is under 40%: producers are willing to absorb a large part of the intended policy
shock on consumer prices.
Table 8 shows the changes in market share by demographic group after rm price responses.
Under mandatory labelling, the consumption of full-fat dessert yogurts increases more in households
whose main shopper is obese (+4:7 pp, compared to +1:1 pp for the whole population). In addition,
this group consumes less skimmed and semi-skimmed fromage blanc, with the market shares falling
by 3:0 pp and 10:1 pp, respectively. Labelling thus fails to achieve the objective of changing the
choices of those who would really need to switch from full- to lower-fat products. Again, the fat tax
seems to be a better policy, as it induces substitution from full-fat to skimmed and semi-skimmed
products for households with obese main shoppers.
[Table 8 about here]
The changes in prots and market share are not shown here in detail for condentiality reas-
ons. Annual prots are calculated using predicted market share and observed household purchase
32 To obtain the new price equilibrium, two full-fat and one semi-skimmed dessert yogurts have to be dropped from
the universal set of products (the algorithm does not converge otherwise). The households who chose these products
are then considered as having selected the "no purchase" option. This covers only 35 out of 8975 possible decisions.
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frequencies for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts over the year, extrapolated to the French popu-
lation using the sampling weights provided by Kantar WorldPanel. Both policies reduce producers
annual prots, with a larger e¤ect from labelling ( 21:0%) than from the fat tax ( 6:1%). Pro-
ducer price responses help them to limit the fall in sales, but require them to reduce their margins
(especially under mandatory labelling). The main national brands su¤er more from labelling than
do retailer brands, with the fall in prots ranging from 34:4% to 76:6% for the former, and 11:3%
to 20:6% for the latter.
The producer price response aims to minimise the fall in prots. This can be explained by
three factors: initial margins; the elasticity and concavity of demand curves; and the competition
between producers and, for each producer, between products in its portfolio.
In the case of mandatory labelling for dessert yogurts, producers can a¤ord large price cuts on
these products as margins are initially substantial: the initial price-cost margin is 67% for full-fat
dessert yogurts, as opposed to only 41% for full-fat fromages blancs. In addition, the estimated
own-price elasticity of demand for full-fat dessert yogurts is  5:1 in the absence of a price response.
Producers can hence expect to win back market share via price cuts. This strategy is constrained
by two factors. First, demand becomes less and less elastic as price falls: the elasticity of full-fat
dessert yogurts is  2:4 after the price response. Prot maximisation entails a trade-o¤ between
lower margins and a larger market share, which is partly determined by the concavity of the demand
function, i.e. the change in elasticity (see Stern, 1987, and Delipalla and Keen, 1992 for the case of
taxation under imperfect competition). Second, each producer faces the price response of all of the
other producers and must in addition optimise its own response over its portfolio of products. For
instance, the demand elasticity for full-fat fromages blancs is  4:8 in the absence of price response.
The producers of these full-fat products have the means of countering the lower price of dessert
yogurts, although they are constrained by their lower initial margins. Mandatory labelling actually
increases competition on the market, by making products more similar. The Herndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) of market shares is initially 921; this would fall to 770 without any price response. For
the tax policy, and without any price response, the HHI only changes little (906 instead of 921).
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an ex ante evaluation of the impacts of a fat tax and mandatory labelling
on market equilibrium. This evaluation requires the separate identication of consumer preferences
for fat-content labels and fat. This is made possible by an exogenous change in legal fat-content
labelling requirements in the French fromage blanc and dessert yogurt market. Following the
recent literature in empirical industrial organization, we combine a exible discrete-choice model
of demand, estimated on scanner data (disaggregated at both the household and product levels),
with a linear-pricing supply model to recover price-cost margins for each manufacturer and to
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determine the food-policy impact on market outcomes.
In the absence of a producer price response, making fat labels mandatory reduces household fat
purchases by about 38%. To obtain a similar e¤ect, and thus compare mandatory labelling to the
fat tax, we set ad valorem taxes of 10% and 5% on the producer price of full-fat and semi-skimmed
products, respectively. Taking into account producer price responses is shown to dramatically
change the policy evaluation. Fat taxes then result in a more modest reduction in fat purchases of
about 9%. However, mandatory labelling reduces household fat purchases by only 1:5%, as dessert
yogurt producers cut their margins to retain customers. This producer reaction entails a large fall
in the price of dessert yogurts, o¤setting 96% of the impact of front-of-pack fat-content labels. As
prices are lower, mandatory labelling likely increases consumer welfare in the short run, while the
fat tax has the opposite e¤ect. Although these welfare calculations do not take into account the
long-run benets of reduced fat intake, the estimated changes in the latter are only small, so that
the health e¤ects will arguably be so as well.
The key policy message of our research here is thus that there is no magic bullet to reduce
fat consumption when we rely only on standard policy tools, as market mechanisms  here the
rmsresponse to policies  can neutralise any intervention. Firm reactions will depend on the
market under consideration and, specically, on the margins. For example, Gri¢ th et al. (2010)
nd higher pass-through rates and e¤ects of a tax on saturated fat in the British butter and
margarine market, where the margins are estimated to be smaller (0.380.49 v.s. 0.520.69 for
dessert yogurts). One alternative policy option, currently being considered by the French public-
health authorities in association with producers, is to promote voluntary limits on the fat (and
sugar) content of products.
While this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to encompass structurally the question
of prices and labels, there are three limitations to our analysis. First, all of the simulation results are
based on a supply model without explicit modelling of the vertical relationships between retailers
and producers. Although the results are very similar when we model them as a two-part tari¤
contract with resale price maintenance (where wholesale prices are such that the retailers price-
cost margins are zero), it would be interesting to check whether other types of vertical relationships
have signicant consequences for the market equilibrium. Second, the set of products is supposed
to be xed, so that rms can only use pricing strategies. However, rms may change their products
too; new products may enter the market, and other products may exit. Last, the demand model
does not take into account, in a structural way, the health e¤ects of fat consumption. As such, it
is di¢ cult to evaluate the long-run welfare e¤ects of each policy, and to rank the various options
according to health. While the short- and long-run welfare e¤ects are probably only little di¤erent
for a single product, this would certainly not be the case for policies which target a large range of
products. We leave these questions for future research.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Mean values of product characteristics
In the universal In the household
product set choice set
Price (std. dev.) 2.44 (1.09) 2.71 (1.22)
Products with a label Label 85% 81%
Skimmed 24% 22%
Semi-skimmed 38% 35%
Full-fat 37% 43%
Fromage Blanc 80% 78%
Texture Smooth 75% 73%
Small pack size Portion < 200g 54% 59%
Organic or bidus products Organic/Bidus 4% 8%
Low-quality retailer and hard-discount brands Low quality 20% 9%
Medium-quality retailer brands Medium quality 39% 23%
High-quality retailer and national brands Reference 40% 68%
Note: Column 1 refers to the means over 224 products, and column 2 to the means over 8497 observed purchases.
31
T
ab
le
2:
M
ar
ke
t
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
F
ro
m
ag
es
bl
an
cs
D
es
se
rt
yo
gu
rt
s
O
ut
si
de
op
ti
on
Sk
im
m
ed
/f
at
-f
re
e
Se
m
i-
sk
im
m
ed
F
ul
l-
fa
t
Se
m
i-
sk
im
m
ed
F
ul
l-
fa
t
N
um
b
er
of
pr
od
uc
ts
(n
um
b
er
w
it
h
a
la
b
el
)
54
(5
4)
63
(6
3)
63
(6
3)
24
(1
2)
20
(0
)
M
ea
n
pr
ic
es
(s
td
.
de
v.
)
in
E
ur
os
0
1.
99
(0
.8
8)
1.
98
(0
.7
8)
2.
95
(1
.1
4)
2.
88
(1
.3
6)
3.
09
(0
.3
9)
M
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
es
in
c.
th
e
ou
ts
id
e
op
ti
on
5.
4%
16
.2
%
38
.9
%
15
.7
%
6.
7%
17
.2
%
M
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
es
ex
c.
th
e
ou
ts
id
e
op
ti
on
17
.1
%
41
.1
%
16
.6
%
7.
1%
18
.2
%
N
ot
e:
T
h
e
m
ea
n
p
ri
ce
s
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
ov
er
th
e
u
n
iv
er
sa
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
se
t;
u
si
n
g
th
e
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
ch
oi
ce
se
t
yi
el
d
s
fa
ir
ly
si
m
il
ar
re
su
lt
s.
32
Table 3: Household characteristics (N=1785)
Mean
Monthly household income (e) 2696 (1435)
Household size 2.6 (1.33)
Male main shopper 4%
Single household 8%
Couple without children 23%
Couple with children 39%
Aged over 65 31%
Body Mass Index (BMI) 24.77 (4.23)
Main shopper overweight: BMI25 40%
Main shopper risky-overweight: BMI27 26%
Main shopper obese: BMI30 12%
Education = Primary 25%
Education = High school 33 %
Education = Baccalaureat 26 %
Education > Baccalaureat 16 %
Notes: Mean over the 1785 households in our sample; Main shoppers body mass index (BMI) is based on self-
reported measures of height and weight.
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Table 5: Changes in average household annual fat purchases, by demographic group
(in grams)
Fat tax Mandatory labeling
Base No producer
response
Producer
response
No producer
response
Producer
responseFat
All 844.28 -305.47 -76.51 -325.90 -12.51
Income
First quartile 855.58 -305.23 -85.26 -318.96 -37.76
Second quartile 845.63 -315.66 -76.08 -330.28 1.33
Third quartile 849.07 -300.44 -71.48 -325.22 -2.03
Fourth quartile 830.06 -300.52 -73.40 -328.36 -11.57
Main shopper BMI
BMI<25 835.62 -303.88 -77.13 -324.15 -18.02
25BMI<30 851.18 -303.42 -75.62 -324.82 -6.97
BMI30 871.11 -318.43 -75.52 -337.32 1.83
Male 990.50 -370.44 -63.04 -393.50 -9.29
Female 837.82 -302.60 -77.10 -322.92 -12.65
Aged under 65 808.00 -296.84 -77.55 -313.18 -12.46
Aged above 65 926.85 -325.11 -74.15 -354.86 -12.60
Notes: Annual fat purchases are calculated using the predicted choice probabilities and household purchase frequency
in 2007; under mandatory labeling all products have a fat-content label; under the fat tax, there is an ad valorem
tax of 10% for full-fat and 5% for semi-skimmed products.
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Table 6: Change in consumer surplus, by demographic group (in percent)
Fat tax Label
All -2.15 52.85
Income
First quartile -2.35 55.35
Second quartile -2.19 53.26
Third quartile -2.07 48.34
Fourth quartile -2.01 53.82
Main shopper BMI
BMI<25 -2.14 52.08
25BMI<30 -2.17 54.20
BMI30 -2.14 53.44
Male -2.63 53.57
Female -2.13 52.82
Aged under 65 -2.23 56.50
Aged above 65 -1.95 44.55
Notes: Under mandatory labeling all products have a fat-content label; under the fat tax, there is an ad valorem
tax of 10% for full-fat and 5% for semi-skimmed products; all results include the producersprice responses.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dening the relevant market
We here want to exploit the di¤erence in labelling rules between fromages blancs and yogurts,
so the set of alternatives must necessarily include all of the fromages blancs. We thus have to
determine whether both standard and dessert yogurts should be included in the denition of the
relevant market for fromages blancs. The purpose of any relevant market test is to measure the
degree of competition exerted over a given product from the other products. In its guidelines
for the assessment of relevant markets, the European Commission (1997) denes the three main
factors determining competition: substitution on the demand side, substitution on the supply side
generated by the strategic responses of competitors to the producers decision, and the entry of
new competitors on the market. We here check only for demand substitution, which represents the
most immediate competitive constraint for producers. With each decision regarding a products
ingredients and marketing-mix, producers must bear in mind that customers can switch from one
variety to another.
Demand substitutions is analyzed via the estimation of an Almost Ideal Demand System
(Deaton and Mullbauer, 1980). This relates the yearly budget share sij of products j = 1; ::; J for
household i = 1; :::; N to log total expenditure xi for unavored yogurts and fromages blancs, and
the log price J-vector pi, through the following equation
sij = jxi + jpi + j(xi   a(pi; )) + uij ;
where a(pi; ) is a nonlinear price aggregator that can be approximated by a Stone price index. Here
xi is a set of socio-demographic variables (number of household members, position in the lifecycle,
socio-economic status, gender and education of the main shopper, whether the main shopper has a
body mass index over 27, and the region and type of residential area). Following Lecocq and Robin
(2006), product-level prices are computed as the average price of all purchases made in the same
region and area, and we control for the endogeneity of total expenditure via a control function
approach with household income as an instrument.
The rst row of Table A.1 presents the conditional (on total expenditure) uncompensated
elasticities for fromages blancs with respect to the price of fromages blancs, dessert yogurts and
standard yogurts. The second and third rows display the same elasticities for dessert and standard
yogurts respectively. We can see that there is a signicant increase in purchases of fromages blancs
as the price of dessert yogurts increases. A similar but insignicant e¤ect is found for the price of
standard yogurts. This shows that dessert yogurts should be included in the relevant market for
fromages blancs, but not standard yogurts. The other cross-price elasticities are insignicant.
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Table A.1: Uncompensated price elasticities
Fromages Blancs Dessert Yogurts Standard Yogurts
Fromages Blancs  0.982 0.393 0.200
(0.218) (0.208) (0.221)
Dessert Yogurts  0.275  1.187  0.381
(0.517) (0.492) (0.523)
Standard Yogurts 0.094  0.265  1.021
(0.182) (0.173) (0.184)
Note: ,  and  represent signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
A.2 Distribution of household WTP conditional on observed choices
The estimates resulting from the maximisation of (13), can be used to determine the distribution
of tastes over the sampled households, fi; ig, as well as functions of these, conditional on the
households observed choices and population parameters (Revelt and Train, 2000). Formally, if
h(i) is such a function, its conditional expectation is given by
E(h(i) j wi; ) =
Z
E(h(i) j wi; ijt; i; )g(ijt j wi)f(i j wi)didijt;
where g(ijt j wi) and f(i j wi) are the densities of ijt and i conditional on the households
observed sequence of choices. From Bayesrule, we have
E(h(i) j wi; ) =
R
E(h(i) j wi; ijt; i; )P (wi j ijt; i; )g(ijt)f(i)didijt
P (wi j ) :
Similarly to (11), and still denoting by ijtd and id the d-th draws from the distribution of ijt
and i, this expectation can be approximated through simulation by
E(h(i) j wi; ) =
PD
d=1E(h(i) j wi; ijtd; id; ; )P (wi j ijtd; id; )eP (wi j ) ; (16)
where eP (wi j ) is given by (12). With h(i) = li, (16) shows the households expected taste for
fat-content labels; if h(i) = li=
p
i , then it describes the households expected willingness-to-pay
for labels.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of the WTP for fat-content labels
WTP0 (%) Median (e)
All 38.05 0.65
Main shoppers body weight
Normal weight (BMI<25) 38.03 0.65
Overweight (25BMI<27) 35.55 0.73
Risky-overweight (27BMI<30) 38.26 0.71
Obese (BMI>30) 40.81 0.47
Income quartile
First 34.58 0.65
Second 38.79 1.22
Third 39.14 0.90
Fourth 39.89 0.35
Male 37.19 0.17
Female 38.11 0.68
Aged under 65 38.70 0.62
Aged over 65 38.03 0.86
Note: Percentage of households with negative WTP.
Table A.3 below shows median WTP according to whether the household never chose or chose
at least once the options listed in the rst column. The nal column shows the p-value for the
hypothesis that the two medians are equal.
Table A.3: Householdsproduct choice and WTP for a fat-content label
Median WTP (e) Equality test
Never At least once p-value
Outside option 1.07 -0.40 0.000
Skimmed/fat-free fromages blancs 0.33 1.05 0.000
Semi-skimmed fromages blancs -0.45 1.01 0.000
Full-fat fromages blancs 0.80 0.42 0.040
Semi-skimmed dessert yogurts 0.88 -1.71 0.000
Full-fat dessert yogurts 1.13 -4.74 0.000
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A.3 Household consumer surplus
The consumer surplus CSi(pt; lt) for household i in period t is calculated using the log-sum formula
proposed by Small and Rosen (1981)
CSi(pt; lt) =
E(maxj uijt(pt; lt))
jpi j
=
1
jpi j
ln
24 JitX
j=0
exp(uijt(pt; lt))
35 ;
where jpi j is the estimated marginal disutility of price for consumer i. Consumer surplus is cal-
culated given the household-specic taste parameters, using the formula in equation (16). The
change in surplus from mandatory fat-content labels, implying new equilibrium prices p and label
variable l, is given by CSi(pt ; l

t )  CSi(pt; lt). With a fat tax, only equilibrium prices vary, and
lt is unchanged. Note that consumer surplus depends on the utility obtained from all alternatives,
including the outside option. It therefore varies across households not only through price sensitiv-
ity, but also from the utility of each alternative, which allows us to take into account the changes
in household utility produced by substitutions between the alternatives.
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